When the Czech Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvyšší správní soud) in Brno ruled to abolish the Workers’ Party (Dělnická strána) on 17 February, on the grounds that the party’s program was extremist, condoned violent acts and posed a threat to democracy by containing a xenophobic, racist, anti-Semitic and homophobic subtext, it was the first time in an independent Czech Republic that a political party had been banned on political grounds. The move has been contested, with DS Chairman Tomáš Vandas arguing that the Court’s decision was “highly suspicious, coming as it does three months before the elections” and that the ruling represented a politically attempt to preclude his party from the democratic process. Further, he has stated that regardless of the court ruling, the party will indeed take part in the next general elections, scheduled for the end of May, either under its current name or under a new name.

Vandas has argued that by banning the DS, in whatever form it takes during the upcoming elections, will in fact add to its share of the vote. Although it enjoys some support at the regional level, the DS has only been able to attract around 1% of the vote at the national level, well below the 5% threshold requirement for a party to enter parliament. Some analysts have cautioned that the ruling will further radicalise the party but what seems most interesting about the decision is not the speculation of the impact it will have on one party but rather on the political system as a whole.

The Civic Democrats (ODS) have proposed a similar judicial examination of the activities of the Communist Party (KSČM), with the argument that following an investigation into the extreme-right in the country, an investigation into the extreme-left would not be out of place; furthermore, the NSS’ ruling could set a precedent for banning the KSČM, with the ODS arguing that the justifications contained in the ruling could be applied to the Communists. With this, a debate seems to be opening about the acceptable parametres of political life in the Czech Republic; while the DS may only attract a small segment of the voting population, the Communist Party continues to pull in a significant percentage of votes and to ban it would be to dramatically alter the country’s political landscape.

While it is often difficult to understand how, given the country’s recent and damaging experience of 40 years of Communist rule, the KSČM continues to receive such a respectable percentage of votes; in the last elections, the Communists won the third-highest share of the vote and if it would be strange to imagine a Czech political landscape with the Communists, it would be equally strange to imagine that landscape without them. But the argument that the ruling banning the DS sets a predecent for banning the Communists seems weak (whatever one’s opinion of the Communists). It remains highly uncommon for a political party to be banned and in fact, although the NSS ruled in favour of suppressing the DS, they had previously dismissed an attempt to have the party banned in 2009, citing a lack of evidence in the case. Furthermore, the grounds on which the DS were banned seem rather particular and, in the case of the Communists, difficult to use as a precedent, as it seems that practice, rather than ideology, played the strongest role in the decision.

A rather insightful analysis has argued that the NSS’ ruling represents “a defining judgement that will establish ideological boundaries that must not be crossed by any political party which aims to remain in operation“. I suspect that although a debate will always exist about the acceptable boundaries of a Liberal society and how permissive is “too permissive” when it comes to accommodating different opinions and groups, there must actually be some clear guidelines for participating in society; advocating or utilising violence and intimidation against others must surely be unacceptable practices. The NSS’ ruling did not ban the DS for “advocating a repugnant and xenophobic political programme, but on the basis of a complex analysis, which proved the existence of a direct link between the discourse of party supporters, their ideology and hateful acts of organized violence“. This seems to be a sound justification, for while it will take more than re-arrangements to the political system to stamp out prejudiced and hateful opinions, banning those who hold and propagate such opinions from engaging in the political sphere if they turn to violence and physically harm others seems to be a fair control mechanism.

There seems to be little backlash against the Court’s decision, although it remains to be seen how the DS may re-group in the run-up to the May elections; until the results of the elections are in, it would be difficult to analyse the impact of the ruling on the electorate. While banning the DS may have little practical impact on Czech politics, what seems most interesting about the NSS ruling is the potential space it opens up for discussions about what the Czech political sphere should look like; what its boundaries are, which groups are truly most representative of the voting public. Politics should not be seen as a static institution but rather as a fluid and changeable sphere. By taking the bold move of banning a political party, the potential to generate a discussion with a wider public involved seems a positive development in the growth of social, civic and political life in the country.

I just read a commentary on openDemocracy by Rein Mullerson, an expert in international law and the rector of Tallinn University Nord.  In it, Mullerson argues that cooler heads who sincerely want to understand Russia must realize that the Kremlin simply acts in its own perceived interest, that it does not seek to wipe out democratic movements (abroad), and that the West should not reflexively view it as the bad guy in its periodic clashes with other states.

He  writes, “Rather, the identification of a single “bogeyman” is part of the problem that belongs to a world where foreign policy is guided by historical memories and even obsessions.”

This is probably good advice for policymakers trying to figure out how to deal with Moscow. But what’s that niggling feeling that something has been left out? What about Russia’s presumption that it should have a say in the foreign policy of other countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union but are now sovereign states?

He continues: “What matters to the Kremlin is not the ideology of other states but their actions towards Russia. In this respect, the comment of Dimitri K Simes and Paul J Saunders are correct to observe that: ‘Moscow has worked quite successfully with democracies such as Germany and Italy, demonstrating that Russia does not have a problem with democratic governments as such…[whereas] Russia’s problem with Georgia is not its democracy but its hostile conduct.’ ”

That could be, but Germany and Italy do not share a border with Russia and neither was part of the Soviet Union, although East Germany was obviously behind the Iron Curtain.  Maybe ideology does not matter to the Kremlin, but who’s in charge does.  And in those regions where it still has influence, Moscow has shown a strong preference for autocrats.  And it is not only the western historical memory that insists on casting Russia in a particular role. Does any reader of this blog need reminding that popular television polls as well as serious surveys show a longing for power among many Russians that can fairly be described as global or even imperial? To be sure, Russia is not the only nation capable of overreach or presumption. But I don’t think its perceived self-interest can be separated from its pursuit of a state of affairs in nearby countries that is often hostile to the west and sometimes hostile to those countries’ own self-determination.

Spotted this recently on BBC Monitoring. I think if I had private chefs and jets and the enforced adulation of a captive populace, I might be a “Good Natured Angel of Peace,” too. True, some of his people are reduced to eating grass to survive, but he’s such a nice guy.

North Korea’s Kim Jong-il gets “Defender of Justice and Peace” award from Russian charities

Text of report in English by state-run North Korean news agency KCNA website

Letter to Kim Jong Il [Kim Cho'ng-il] from Russia

- Leader Kim Jong Il [Kim Cho'ng-il] on Feb. 12 received a letter from O. V. Oleinik, president of the Russian Federation of International Charity Organizations “World of Goodwill”, carrying its decision on awarding Order of “Defender of Justice and Peace” to him.

The Federation awards this highest international order and a gold globe to Kim Jong Il, according to its Feb. 11, 2010, decision, the letter said, and continued: We ask you to receive this order we present to you with boundless reverence in high recognition of your historic exploits performed for the noble cause of the development of education, science and culture, the education of young people in patriotism and morality, the promotion of people’s well-being and goodwill and justice.

We are rejoiced over the fact that the friendly and cultural relations between the two countries are being strengthened with each passing day.

The Monument to “Protectors of Arts for the Century”, a common monument of international value, was erected in Pyongyang as the symbol of unbreakable friendship between the fraternal peoples of Russia and the DPRK by the cooperation we rendered out of good faith.

We regard it as our pride to have inscribed the August name of most respected Kim Jong Il [Kim Cho'ng-il], the great leader of the Korean people, with gold letters on the Monument to “Good Natured Angels of Peace” erected in Moscow and have courteously registered his name on the “Golden Honorary Registration Book of All Nations”, a valuable book distributed to all large libraries in regions and cities of Russia including the Russian State Library.

We hope that you would achieve glorious and fresh successes in your historic activities for the welfare of the Korean nation and the international community with your inexhaustible energy.

We wish the fraternal Korean people welfare, prosperity and peace, the letter said.

Source: KCNA website, Pyongyang, in English 0901 gmt 16 Feb 10

With the run-off vote in the Ukrainian presidential elections looming on Sunday, accusations about political and electoral shenanigans are swirling; the plant responsible for printing ballots was raided in an attempt to seize it, with both Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko’s camps being implicated; supposedly biased election observers from Georgia (and Poland and Lithuania) working to ensure a victory for Tymoshenko; a banking institution providing illegal financial backing an un-named candidate. And, perhaps cynically, none of if it is terribly surprising. The old adage, “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose“, seems to ring particularly and unfortunately true. It’s no great secret that in the years following the “Orange Revolution” of late 2004, society’s disillusionment at the lack of political and economic progress has been the main discourse in the country. The initial sense of euphoria and hope, after large segments of the Ukrainian population mobilised to express their anger at the falsified election results and to bring “fresh blood” into the political system, was quashed under a growing sense of frustration with political in-fighting between the politicians who had stood for change and a seeming inability on their part to reach beyond their differences in order to work towards fulfilling the promise of the revolution. Throw in on-going gas rows with Russia, continuously dismal economic prospects and an ambiguous orientation on the international stage and it’s unsurprising that Ukrainians should be feeling a little burnt-out.

While there is a clear malaise both domestically and internationally, when it comes to the presidential elections, the outcome of Sunday’s vote will perhaps be the strongest indictment against the country’s political realities; that the man who was at the centre of such intense political controversy and electoral malpractice has been the candidate to win the largest portion of votes in the first round of the latest presidential elections, while Viktor Yushchenko, the figure head of the “Orange Revolution” received a truly negligible share of the vote, speaks volumes about the level of dissatisfaction with what appears to be a quick return to “business as usual” in the country. The political in-fighting that saw the Orange camp split has continued over the years and the election campaigns seemed, at times, to be constructed on little more than personal attacks against other opponents. Yanukovych apparently made ”comments based on gender stereotypes about his opponent [Tymoshenko] in declining to participate in a debate” and one can’t help but wonder how truly committed Ukrainian politicians are to making a positive difference. Part of the problem, surely, is that the contentious political realities represent the on-going debate about the image, role and identity of the country. Ukraine may be a free, independent and democratic country but it remains unclear who this country will be for; dichotomies of East versus West or pro-European versus pro-Russia versus pro-neutrality are perhaps simplistic but they do speak to the challenges of democracy- and state-building projects in the post-Communist region.

During a panel discussion on the challenges facing public freedoms in post-Communist society that took place in Prague and coincided with the 20th anniversary of ‘89, Jan Sokol commented that, “we rejoiced in our own freedom but got frightened by the freedom of others.” Such a statement seems to epitomise the on-going problems in Ukraine; in the decades following the end of Communism and independence, Ukraine has so obviously struggled with its freedom. Freedom, yes, but for whom? The presidential elections in Ukraine, as much now as in 2004, represent an opportunity for the country to express its opinion on the current state of affairs; and its opinion on who will be spoken for in the coming years. It seems unfortunate that Ukrainian politics, as well as the debate about what Ukraine is, are largely an “either, or” scenario.

The manner in which an electoral campaign progresses can be a good indication of a country’s political, social and economic situation and the developments in Romania’s recent elections paint a complex picture of the country’s dynamics. The election campaign and outcomes demonstrate the elements that have plagued Romania since the decades following 1989; corruption charges, public mistrust of politicians and political and economic instability. Even since joining the EU in 2007, Romania has done little to shed its image as a country whose political and economic instability is underpinned by corruption and a lack of transparency and the most recent presidential elections indicate a disturbing domestic continuity.

The November/December presidential elections followed several months of a caretaker government, after the former government fell in October in a vote of no-confidence. Romania’s political and economic situations are closely tied and it is hoped that with a functioning government, the country will be able to demonstrate to the IMF, who suspended an emergency aid package amid political instability, that the money should be released. But the Romanian elections seems awfully reminiscent of Moldova’s elections from earlier this year; as soon as the results were announced, it was denounced as fraudulent, with what defeated former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana called “extremely clear evidence” of vote rigging. With a minuscule vote difference separating him from incumbent Traian Basescu (49.67 per cent to 50.33 per cent), Geoana’s Social Democrat party filed a complaint with the country’s Constitutional Court that ballot-stuffing, vote-buying, bribery and multiple voting had occurred. Fresh elections were called for and although the Court ordered a recount of 138,000 voided votes, it only found that 2,247 should be included in the tally. 1,260 were given to Basescu, with the rest going to Geoana; these additional votes were insufficient to change the ultimate outcome of the election and Geoana has subsequently accepted the results, while maintaining that the vote itself was unfairly conducted.

The Constitutional Court’s decision to order a recount of the elections invalidated votes amid accusations of vote tampering seems to validate claims by the OSCE’s election monitoring mission that although the election was generally conducted according to its democratic standards, allegations of irregularities should be seriously examined. But although superficial similarities may exist between the controversial nature of the Romanian and the Moldovan elections, one factor sets them apart; Romania is an EU member state and Moldova is not. While the Moldovan election garnered high levels of attention from both the OSCE and the EU, who condemned rampant vote falsification as contravening the democratic commitments and standards of both organisations, there has been relatively little attention paid to the Romanian vote.

For it seems shocking that these kinds of electoral shenanigans could go on in an EU member state. One would think that the democratic conditionality set for acceding countries would be sufficiently enforced to ensure compliance with basic democratic standards; free, fair and transparent elections should figure prominently in such standards. While it’s no secret that democratic development and the implementation of certain standards has made slow or incomplete progress, it’s surprising that given such a clear example of the short-comings of Romania political and democratic development, a rather permissive attitude seems to prevail in the EU. Having insisting on conditionality criteria during the accession process, with indisputably varying success, the attitude now seems to indicate that once a country is in as a member, such considerations become unimportant. As a news-story, the Romanian elections seem to have garnered scant attention. The EU has not publicly taken any steps to reprimand Romania or even to make a statement about the questionable vote-count. Even the IMF seems relatively satisfied with the results of the election, emphasising rather their optimistic outlook on the domestic situation in face of the “difficult political and economic environment“.

But it would be ridiculous to believe that after a bit of a rough year, Romania is poised to finally get back on its feet. A culture of mistrust, bribery and corruption has become synonymous with Romanian politics and the controversial nature of the Romanian presidential elections is indicative of the political, and related economic, instability that seems to be an innate part of the country’s domestic dynamics. That seems unlikely to change, as there seems to be a clear lack of political will to initiate any meaningful change. It’s shocking that the EU has not clamoured more loudly about allegations of election misconduct during the presidential elections; that such behaviour can occur in an EU member state seems in complete contravention of the Union as a bastion of democracy and democratic standard setting. The elections paint a disturbing picture of the domestic political situation and reflects badly on the EU as a whole, while giving yet another example of a democratic deficit not only in the Union’s institutions but in it’s attitude as well.

Civil society in the post-Communist region is a topic of intense academic and political discussion; it is one aspect of the transition process that is most difficult to assess and perhaps the one that is the most crucial to its ultimate success. It has been criticised as being weak and under-developed in comparison to older, more “mature” democratic systems but given the unprecedented nature of transition and political and social development in Central Europe, it is perhaps too early for any kind of comparative analysis to be particularly helpful. However, several recent polls about attitudes towards politics and politicians in the Czech Republic help to give an interesting impression of contemporary civil society.

The transition process that developed in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic was largely dictated by Václav Klaus’ staunch defense of the market, the state and the individual as distinct and independent bodies; the concept of and the actual emergence of civil society was irrelevant to the process. Such an attitude was clearly in opposition to Václav Havel’s emphasis on civil society as a tool for democratisation and the basis of a truly democratic political system. Such a polarisation in attitudes towards the role of civil involvement is perhaps unsurprising, given the unprecedented situation of developing the organisations, relationships and interest required for a functioning civil society. But, arguably, a Klausite disinterest for civil society is visible in current Czech society.

Recent polls released in the Czech press are indicative of current attitudes towards the domestic political situation and indicate a change, in the decades since the transition process began, in attitudes towards politicians. That Czechs are placing more trust in the government than in the president, for the first time since November 1989, is perhaps unsurprising, given the country’s increasingly questionable stance in Europe during the president Klaus fiasco in signing the Lisbon Treaty and the negative attention that it brought. It seems a positive development that more trust is being placed in the government, as a Czech president’s position of relative symbolic power should not be forgotten in the face of the government’s accountability through direct electoral legitimation and responsibility.

But the most telling polls found that 87% of respondents were unsatisfied with the political situation in their country and that interest in politics has fallen since the 1990s. Political interest and involvement, measured in its most basic form, is telling; whereas during the period 1990 to 1999, around 90% of respondents claimed to discuss politics with friends on a regular basis, today less than 75% make that same claim. Furthermore, people attach less importance to politics and follow political developments less frequently. It is an interesting dichotomy, that a decline in political satisfaction is matched by a decline in political interest and seems to be indicative of a wider convergence with Western political developments.

The phenomenon of declining political participation in mature, consolidated democracies has been a staple of political theory and was popularised by Putnam’s 1995 “Bowling Alone” theory. What is perhaps surprising in the relatively negative perspectives presented in the recent polls on Czech attitudes towards politics and the indifference to political involvement is the perception that the Czech Republic, despite its obvious progress, it not yet in the position to call itself a mature, consolidated democracy such as those in Western Europe and North America; thus, it should not act like one. But if reference to research in other fields is admissible, it would be interesting to apply the argument made in a work on the evolution of Czech retail attitudes to the context of political attitudes. It has been argued that, in the case of shopping habits and attitudes, 50 years of gradual evolution has been condensed into 15 in the Czech context, due to the impact and influence of a globalised approach to retail services.

While comparative analysis between very different domestic contexts may not, at this stage, be a useful approach when assessing the development of domestic political attitudes, it may at least be an interesting exercise to analyse attitudes in one sphere for their relevance; just as it is possible to imagine that Czech retail habits have undergone radical transformation in a relatively short period of time, due to a globalised and interconnected environment, it is also possible that a similar process could be at work in the political sphere.

But while an accelerated convergence with generally accepted Western democratic norms, such as a decline in political participation, could be a valid explanation for the declining interest in and importance placed on politics in the Czech Republic, it does not make such findings particularly satisfactory. A rise in political indifference is lamentable in any context and, given the 20 year anniversary of the fall of Communism, it is a topic that is of particular relevance, not only in a regional but also a global context. In a recent speech to commemorate the anniversary, Václav Havel argued that,”[p]eople should engage in politics if they cannot watch it anymore, and they want it to be different.” Given the clear displeasure towards the Czech political situation and the lack of interest with which it is addressed, such words may seem a classically Havel formulation of the ideal; but with democracy and reform stagnating across the globe, it seems that an active and functioning civil society remains a relevant and necessary tool to shorten the gap between state and individual. A “Bowling Alone” approach has done little to strengthen and advance the state of democracy in supposedly “mature” democratic systems and it would be counter-intuitive to believe that such an attitude is beneficial to democratic newcomers.

Although there are no official statistics on the number of Roma women who have undergone forced sterilisation in the Czech Republic, there seems to be an increasing recognition of the problem; that the government “expressed regret” yesterday for “illegal” sterilisations in the country is a positive development yet falls short of a fully appropriate response. There remains great disagreement about how sterilisation was used, with doctors and medical officials claiming that it was used solely in cases when it was medically necessary and Roma and human rights groups arguing that it was used as a form of birth and population control and that women were coerced or not given sufficient information about the implications of the procedure. Despite this, a 2005 report by the Czech Ombudsman accepted that forced sterilisations had occured and found instances of recommendations at the regional or local levels for “health education programmes” to reduce birth rates and family sizes within the Roma community. It went on to suggest a policy of state compensation for women who had been affected during the period 1973 to 1991. A state compensation policy has, nevertheless, never been developed, although some women have been compensated in an unofficial manner.

While compensation for past injustices is one response to the problem that needs to be addressed, it is important for the government to investigate fully claims that the practice is on-going. Cases of forced sterilisation have been reported in 2007 and 2008, despite claims that it was abandoned as a practice in 1991. The Roma community suffers from a particular disadvantage when it comes to medical treatment in the Czech Republic; not only do they face discrimination in services and treatment, they also face distrust of the medical community and a lack of knowledge about treatments and about their rights. These related problems are at play in situations of forced sterilisation and women are thus particularly vulnerable, as these procedures generally follow the birth and often in a confused environment.

Even if a policy of state compensation would be put into place, it would do little to avoid future abuses of patients’ rights and wishes. Rather, the Czech government should not only investigate cases of forced sterilisation, the doctors who performed them and under what circumstances but they should also launch disciplinary action against those involved. Addressing the issue represents a major stumbling block for the Czech state in promoting and protecting the rights of all its citizens and for addressing discrimination that seems inherent to the medical system. While addressing the problem is an important first step, it must not be the only step; serious and meaningful investigations must follow if the government is serious about bridging the gaps in Czech society.

Do you know what does it mean “stipend” in Latvia? It is minimal state support given to rising numbers of unemployed people. It is 100 lats, approx. 140 euro and is given only to people who participate in municipal or state public works. “You cannot survive on that, but at least you have some income,” Latvian sociologist Aigar Freimanis has told me.

Crisis situation deepens even as there are many reports about how world is emerging from crisis. Poor Latvia is one of the examples where there is not even the light at the end tunnel. Coalition government strictly follows the line of IMF and EU and is cutting and cutting in the budget for next year. They do not have any other way. Income tax will be 26 %, wages in public sector cut again, even some of them are already at minimum wage level.

“There is a great level of distrust, only about 25 % of people has trust in prime minister and president,” Mr. Freimanis has told. “But there is one positive news: Latvians got used to crisis situation, they know how to handle it, they have changed their habits and lifestyle. It is not already the issue on which you can rise emotions.”

Well, even after this explanation I would not like to be Latvian nowadays, but I have deep sympathy with nation(s) in Baltic area. They are exposed to the crisis heavily as small and open economies. It is sad that they did not attract too much solidarity from European Union, when, for example last March, Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany has asked for easing Maastricht criteria which would allow Baltics plus Hungary, the worst affected, to adopt euro and to have some shield.

Strict answer: NO. EU solidarity has shown to be empty slogan during times of crisis. National interests prevail in Europe, which is bad for EU as global entity as well as for localy affected people. Maybe it is too naive to expect helping hand from official friends in bad times.

Eurobarometer, Pew research and Pasos poll, all of them have shown that postivite attitude of Latvians and Hungarians towards EU has diminished significantly.  Longterm consequencies? Extremists and populists will get into parliaments of both, Latvia and Hungary, which have elections planned next year.And as it was proven by the election of two unknown politicians (one of them probably with communist past) into the two most important EU jobs, I wonder if our president Vaclav Klaus was not right about Lisbon treaty and all EU mess.

It is not about energy security, as you might guess after Brazilian black out and new Ukrainian negotiations on gas delivery. This is supposed to be about how we, Czechs in particular, and Central Europeans in general, feel twenty years after what one might call velvet revolution and other change of regime.

And the feeling is quite bleak. According to Median survey, 88 percent of Czechs is not satisfied with political situation in Czech Republic. They feel widespread corruption, lack of leadership, lobbying and hidden deals, people are not willing to participate in civic activities because they consider them as nonsense in society, where politicians accused of corrupt practice do not resign, where leaders do not lead but lie and where unreformed communists are part of power game in parliament.

One of my colleagues even suggested that situation resemble the beginning of 1970s, so called normalisation, where Czech society had closed itself inward. People were just struggling to surivive working days to go to their weekend houses with apathy towards anything political and blind towards any civic activity.

All the stuff might be considered even worse due to recent economic crisis which goes with political one. Just ask anybody in Czech Republic about politics and economy and you hear only complaints. It might be much more the same in Slovakia or Poland, but it seems to me that people there are much more active, during harsh years of political and economical transformation they learned much more to take their own destiny in their hands - and, for example, travel to find a work abroad. Czechs are maybe too lazy to do that, they prefer to sit down with guys in local beer pubs and talk.

It might look too pessimistic, but seeing all the symptoms of political and economic crisis with Russians approaching to tight us up in economical spheres, with NATO role diminishing and insider EU quarels one must ask: where have we been going all these twenty years? And where our children will go?

So far, darkness of postcommunism is my answer, not liberal democracy with clear rules about which we had been dreaming while freezing at demonstrations twenty years ago.

All four major Czech newspapers have the headline on the frontpage today: Klaus has won over Europe or Klaus has defeated Europe (Brussels). Even the same headline has also newspaper where I am employed, I would strongly disagree with this interpretation. All the Europe plus Czech voters were blackmailed by president who used and misused political stalemate in our country to push through the idea which does not have support among majority of Czech voters. Klaus defeated mainly the rest of Czech politicians.

They elected their MPs and Senators who ratified treaty with European charter of fundamental rights included. One guy, who was elected by the mishmash election by these MPs and Senators (nobody clearly knows today, what kind of strange deals were behind his election), has decided to opt-out of the charter and has used case of Sudeten German property as tool to achieve that - play at sensitive historical issue as well as at nerves of leading EU politicians.

Now Czechs are our of charter, which according to some experts anyway does not mean too much in comparison with similar Czech document - only Czechs now could not raise their cases towards European court in Luxembourg (as explanation goes).

One of my colleagues has said that Czech Republic has achieved almost nothing with use of nuclear weapon threat.

Damage is done. Elected Czech political leaders have emptyed space for President, whose influence - since he was involved in government fall in March - is growing, he is occupying more and more public space and influencing more and more political and other decisions, even he and his small team in Prague’s castle seem to be more and more isolated. This is very dangerous side of Czech democracy being in limbo.